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The origins of current initiatives to do awaywith the Scorpions go back several years. In2001 the National Prosecuting Authority
(NPA) approved an investigation into allegations of
corruption in the awarding of arms deal contracts.
In October 2002 they announced that this probe
would be extended to include allegations of bribery
against Jacob Zuma, then South Africa’s deputy
president.
On the 23rd of August 2003 Bulelani Ngcuka, head
of the NPA, told a press conference that the NPA
had chosen to prosecute Jacob Zuma’s financial
advisor Schabir Shaik, but
We have concluded that, while there is a
prima facie case of corruption against the
deputy president, our prospects of success
are not strong enough. That means that we
are not sure if we have a winnable case.
Accordingly we have decided not to
prosecute the deputy president (Mail and
Guardian online 2003). 
Political commentator, Aubrey Matshiqi has argued
that this statement by Ngcuka ‘has in some ways
overshadowed every action taken in relation to
Zuma by the NPA since that point.’ Until June
2005, when Zuma was himself brought to court on
charges of corruption after being dismissed from his
post as deputy president, ‘it fuelled suspicions that
the NPA wished to tarnish Zuma’s name without
prosecuting him’ (Matshiqi 2007:10). 
It was Ngcuka himself who became the first
casualty of the statement. In September 2003 a
prominent newspaper published allegations that
Ngcuka had spied for the apartheid government.




the politics of justice
In May 2008 legislation was tabled in Parliament providing for the dissolution of the Directorate of Special
Operations (known as the ‘Scorpions’), an investigative unit based in the National Prosecuting Authority. The
draft legislation provides that Scorpions members will selectively be incorporated into a new investigative unit
located within the SAPS. These developments followed a resolution passed at the African National Congress
National Conference in Polokwane in December 2007, calling for the unit to be disbanded. Since December
the ANC has been forced to defend its decision in the face of widespread support for the Scorpions. One of
the accusations made by the ANC was that the Scorpions were involved in politically motivated targeting of
ANC members. This article examines the issue of political manipulation of criminal investigations and argues
that doing away with the Scorpions will in fact increase the potential for such manipulation thereby
undermining the principle of equality before the law. 
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Commission, which was appointed to investigate
them. But following a finding by the Public Protector
that Ngcuka’s August statement was ‘unfair and
improper’, it seemed that Ngcuka felt that his
position had become untenable. He resigned in July
2004.    
It is necessary to understand the political backdrop 
to these events. This primarily relates to the
emergence of a constituency amongst members of
the ANC and its tripartite alliance partners, the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)
and the South African Communist Party (SACP),
which wanted to ensure that Jacob Zuma would
become South Africa’s next president. Since Zuma
had been appointed as Thabo Mbeki’s deputy
president in 1999, he was in some ways his natural
successor – but this particular constituency in fact
regarded Zuma as a preferable alternative to Mbeki.
On a formal level this was primarily because Zuma
was seen to be more amenable to the ‘left’ orientated
agenda that they wanted to pursue. However, there
were other factors that contributed to support for
Zuma, notably his less remote personal and political
style. 
The intensifying rivalry between these two ‘camps’
within the ANC has overshadowed South African
politics in recent years. At its December 2007
conference, where delegates voted for the dissolution
of the Scorpions, the ‘Zuma camp’ became the
dominant force in the ANC, appointing Jacob Zuma
as ANC president.
Allegations of political manipulation  
There were therefore already strong suspicions that
the Ngcuka statement had been part of a deliberate
agenda to prevent Zuma from becoming president by
the time of Schabir Shaik’s conviction in June 2005.
Shaik’s conviction in turn was followed by a chorus
of allegations that Zuma was the target of a political
conspiracy and that agencies of the criminal justice
system were being used against him. For instance,
shortly after the Shaik judgment, COSATU issued a
statement saying: 
The events of the past weeks confirm a long
held view by COSATU that the trial of Schabir
Shaik was nothing but a political trial of the
Deputy President in absentia. (COSATU 2005)
But while the outcry following the Shaik judgment
included attacks on the judiciary as a whole, the
key targets of suspicion remained the NPA and the
Scorpions. It was widely believed that they were
acting as instruments of Thabo Mbeki and singling
out Zuma to be discredited and then prosecuted,
while a number of other ANC leaders, who had also
been implicated in the arms deal, were ignored. 
In retrospect it has emerged that the decision not to
prosecute Zuma was probably made with the
approval of President Thabo Mbeki (Feinstein
2007:230). Ironically, it therefore appears that Zuma
was being protected from prosecution – as was
allegedly the case with other beneficiaries of the
arms deal within the ANC. 
But however the decision was taken, some form of
public explanation as to why Shaik, but not Zuma,
was being prosecuted, would have been needed
from Ncguka. Therefore it would have been
necessary for Ncguka to address the public as he
did on 23 August 2003. 
Whether Ncguka’s statement was intended to
discredit Zuma (as has consistently been alleged by
Zuma’s supporters), or whether the trial of Schabir
Shaik was intended as a means of implicating Zuma
‘in absentia’ will perhaps never be clear.1 However,
these are the key, and most credible, allegations of
‘political manipulation’ of the criminal justice
system that have been made by the Zuma camp.
Hostility towards the Scorpions 
Already in April 2005, prior to the conviction of
Schabir Shaik, Mbeki appointed the Khampepe
Commission in response to pressure from within the
ANC to ‘relocate’ the Scorpions into the SAPS. Once
Shaik was convicted, and Jacob Zuma charged with
corruption, political mobilisation in support of
Zuma strengthened, and animosity against the
Scorpions escalated. In essence the hostility against
the Scorpions from the ANC is a product of the
mobilisation in support of Zuma and represents an
effort to protect Zuma’s candidacy for president.
It does indeed appear that Mbeki wanted to retain
the Scorpions. His appointment of the Khampepe
Commission can be seen as a way of trying to
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defend them. The destruction of the Scorpions is
thus also a key symbolic vehicle for confirming the
dominance of the ‘Zuma camp’ over the ‘Mbeki
camp’ within both the ANC and government.
(Though it has taken on this meaning within the
ANC, it should nevertheless be emphasised that
calls to retain the Scorpions do not necessarily
indicate support of or opposition to either of the
‘camps’ within the ANC.)
But Zuma was not the only ANC leader investigated
by the Scorpions in relation to the arms deal. In
2006 former ANC Chief Whip, Tony Yengeni, a
respected and popular ANC leader, who like Zuma,
had played a prominent role in the struggle against
apartheid, was imprisoned after being convicted in
2003 on a charge of having defrauded parliament
during the arms deal. 
In addition a number of ANC members of
parliament and others, who were implicated in
what came to be known as the Travelgate saga,
were also subject to a Scorpions investigation. In
2006 evidence also started coming to light that
appeared to indicate that the SAPS National
Commissioner, Jackie Selebi, had received bribes
from alleged drug lord Glenn Agliotti. Agliotti was
also alleged to have channelled funds to Selebi
from murdered mining magnate Brett Kebble. The
fact that Selebi himself had been a prominent
member of the ANC and that Kebble had been a
major benefactor of various ANC members and
structures, was interpreted by some as evidence that
the Scorpions were targeting the ANC. 
It became convenient for the ANC, once the ‘Zuma
camp’ had become dominant at Polokwane, to use
these cases to convince itself that the Scorpions had
been ‘targeting’ the ANC. It was also a convenient
way for the ANC to avoid confronting corruption
within its own ranks. Rather than engaging in a
process of self-reflection and self-criticism
(something which is said to be one of the strengths
of the ANC) the party chose to blame the Scorpions
for the fact that several of its members had been
implicated in corruption.  
Allegations of political bias against the Scorpions
Several of the allegations made against the
Scorpions by the ANC reflect the belief that the
Scorpions were being used to target ANC members. 
ANC executive member Siphiwe Nyanda said that
the Scorpions were ‘used to pursue a political
agenda and to target certain people in the ANC to
the benefit of sectarian and foreign interests’ (Basson
2008).  ANC Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe is
quoted as having referred to the Scorpions as a
‘political unit’ that had been ‘infiltrated by apartheid
‘security branch’ members who were ‘targeting
erstwhile enemies’ – the ANC (Omarjee 2008).  
Countering this the acting head of the National
Prosecuting Authority, Mokotedi Mpshe, has said
that ‘most, if not all, the members of the Scorpions
have joined with good and honourable intentions,
to serve in the best interests of the country’
(Maughan 2008). On another occasion Mpshe said
emphatically that there was no truth to these claims,
pointing out that none of these claims had been
verified (Hartley 2008). Although former apartheid
agents do form part of the rank and file of the
Scorpions it does not follow that they have been the
guiding force behind the unit. 
The Scorpions have been under the authority of
officials appointed by the ANC government.
Included among its founding core members are
investigators involved in bringing apartheid era
security force members such as Eugene de Kock to
justice. If it is true that the Scorpions have applied a
certain zeal in investigating allegations against ANC
members this may be seen simply as reflecting a
dedication to the organisation’s mission to uphold
the law without fear or favour. This is consistent
with a concern to protect the integrity of the South
African state as governed by the Constitution and
does not imply an apartheid era inspired hostility
towards the ANC. Rather than having any
credibility, the allegation that the Scorpions are
acting as ‘apartheid agents’ can better be
understood as fitting in with the ANC’s need to
demonise the unit in order to mobilise public
opinion against them.2
The only credible allegations (though they have not
been proved) that the Scorpions have been used as
a political instrument, concern the claim that the
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the National Commissioner will be able to veto
investigations that do not meet with his approval. 
The presence of the Scorpions has also served as a
means to ensure the legal accountability of senior
SAPS officials. Due to general problems of capacity,
the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) is
not able to carry out the type of sophisticated
investigation that led to the charges against Selebi
(see the article by Burger and Adonis in this issue of
SACQ). Where it investigates cases successfully
these are generally cases of a much more
straightforward and ‘routine’ nature. Without the
Scorpions there will be no investigative body
outside of the SAPS that can subject higher-level
officials of the SAPS to substantive investigation.
And the fact that the Scorpions could be subject to
investigation by the SAPS meant that they too were
not above legal scrutiny.
If the legislation is passed and all investigative
bodies fall under his authority, the SAPS National
Commissioner will be above the law. This means
that anyone that he wishes to protect, or who is in a
position to pressure or influence him, will also be
shielded from justice. Centralising all investigative
power in the SAPS therefore undermines South
Africa’s potential to uphold the principle of equality
before the law, which is a key principle of the
Constitution. In addition, the monopoly of
investigative power within the SAPS may also
provide senior SAPS members with the power to
manipulate politicians and the political process,
thus undermining democracy.  Not only will they
be above the law, but they will be in a position of
power over those in political authority. 
Conclusion 
One of the issues that has been of concern in South
Africa for several years has been the South African
government’s handling of investigations into the
arms deal, and in particular that people associated
with irregularities in the deal have been protected
from justice (Feinstein 2007).
The concerns of the ‘Zuma camp’ are however
quite distinct from this. Rather than arguing that
proper investigations have not been allowed to take
their course, they have focused on the idea that,
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‘shield’ of impunity that was provided to ANC
members in relation to the arms deal was deliberately
lifted in order to counter the political threat posed by
Jacob Zuma to Thabo Mbeki. It should be
emphasised that this is essentially an allegation that
the National Director of Public Prosecutions used his
authority over the Scorpions to ensure that certain
people were protected from justice, but that a
decision was made to remove this protection in the
case of Schabir Shaik. This is not an allegation that
Shaik was wrongfully convicted. Considering that his
conviction has been confirmed successively on
appeal there cannot be reasonable doubt about his
guilt.
The impression that state authority has been used to
shield favoured individuals was reinforced in 2007 by
the events surrounding the suspension of Ncguka’s
successor, Vusi Pikoli, after he apparently refused to
submit to pressure to prevent him from instituting
charges against SAPS National Commissioner Selebi.
The matter is the subject of the Ginwala Commission
of Inquiry.  
If there is evidence of the criminal justice system
being manipulated in this way it should provide the
basis for action to ensure that no one is deliberately
protected from the course of justice by those in
positions of power. But dissolving the Scorpions will
do nothing to reduce this risk. 
The ability to ensure that all people in South Africa
can be held legally accountable will be significantly
reduced without a diversity of agencies with the
capacity to investigate organised crime and
corruption of their own initiative.3 Dissolving the
Scorpions will concentrate all crime investigation
powers under the SAPS National Commissioner.
Since the appointment of Jackie Selebi it has been
accepted that the National Commissioner may be a
political appointment of the ANC-led government
and thus highly susceptible to political influence. The
new General Laws Amendment Bill, which provides
for the incorporation of the Scorpions into the SAPS,
expressly provides that the National Commissioner
will have the authority to decide which investigations
are dealt with by the envisaged priority crimes
investigation unit (see the proposed South African
Police Service Act section 16A(12)). This means that
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while some people were apparently protected from
investigation and prosecution, Shaik, and following
him, Zuma, were not. Rather than endorsing the
calls for proper investigations to be conducted they
have instead mobilised around the idea that Zuma
is a ‘political target’, and have recently extended
this into allegations that the Scorpions were
involved in generally targeting the ANC. Political
pressure of this kind from leaders of South Africa’s
governing party is likely to reinforce the situation
where powerful individuals are selectively
protected from justice. This is a problem that
undermines the rule of law and the principle of
equality before the law, the principle that criminal
justice agencies should operate without fear or
favour to those in positions of authority. 
But if it is true that investigative mechanisms have
been subject to political manipulation, the key
problem has then not been that Shaik, Zuma and
others have been subjects of investigation, but that
high-level political officials obstructed other
investigations that should have gone ahead. Unless
political leaders and others take a firm stand against
this type of practice it is likely to continue and
intensify. If the ANC indeed wishes to prevent this
type of abuse it should motivate government to
adopt and enforce guidelines regulating the
relationship between senior political officials and
the leadership of investigative and prosecutorial
agencies, in order to discourage and prevent this
type of political interference.4
The dissolution of the Scorpions, and concentration
of all investigative powers under the SAPS, will
itself do nothing to reduce the risk of this type of
abuse. In fact it is likely to accentuate the problem.
This is not least because it sends out a powerful
signal to investigative personnel that the ANC will
punish agencies that dare to subject its senior
members to investigation. 
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Endnotes
1 It may be assumed that if the NPA had chosen to 
prosecute Zuma along with Shaik this would not have
been any more satisfactory to Zuma’s supporters.
2 It is possible that there is a more direct psychological 
dimension to the ANC tendency to demonise the
Scorpions. Being subjected to investigation by the
Scorpions may re-evoke the past traumas of being
targeted by the security police for some ANC members.
3 The distinction is important. The Special Investigating 
Unit which falls under the department of justice and is
responsible for the investigation of corruption only
enters into investigations when it is authorised to do so
by the State President.
4 Examples of legislation of this kind, regulating the 
relationship between government ministers and the
police commissioner, may be found in some Australian
states.
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